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Abstract 
This paper examines interethnic conflict on grazing land previously accessed as common 
property.   The study was undertaken in Mieso District of eastern Ethiopia where two ethnic 
groups experience different production systems – pastoral and agropastoral. Game theoretic 
approach and analytic narratives have been used as analytical tools. Results show that the 
historical change in land use by one of the ethnic groups, resource scarcity, violation of 
customary norms, power asymmetry and livestock raids are some of the factors that have 
contributed to the recurrence of the conflict. The role of raids in triggering conflict and 
restricting access to grazing area becomes particularly important. Socio-economic and 
political factors are responsible for power asymmetry and increasing scale of raids. The joint 
effect of an increase in trend of violence and a decline in capacity of customary authority in 
conflict management advances state role in establishing enforceable property rights 
institutions. This would be successful only if policies and intervention efforts are redirected 
at: 1) suppressing incentives for violence, 2) establishing new institutional structures, in 
consultation with clan elders of both parties and 3) building internal capacity to monitor 
conflict-escalating events. 
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1 Introduction: An Overview of Resource Conflict 
Scarcity driven resource conflict is often seen as an outcome of intense competition on natural 
resources in the context of environmental stress (Homer-Dixon 1994, 2001). In Africa, such 
conflict has continually weakened and reduced countries’ capacity to achieve their 
development agenda. Those occurring at micro-level on specific resources prevent many 
countries from undergoing rapid social and economic change (Huggins 2003). Conflict on 
grazing lands in pastoral and agropastoral areas of the continent forms a subset of such event. 
As some have shown, change in conflict technologies (from use of spears to automatic 
weapons) cause significant instability (Otim 2002). The increasing trend of disputes within 
and between pastoral and agropastoral groups due to resource scarcity, the resulting tensions 
and the inadequacy of existing institutional frameworks for conflict management imply the 
need to search for an innovative approach to overcome the problem (Cousins 1996; 
Vanderlinden 1999).   
Many have suggested that conflict on resource use should be considered as part of resource 
management. This is because effective community based management institutions can 
improve access for different users when there is variation in resource condition across space 
at a given time (Haro and Doyo 2004). They point out that in areas where there is high 
insecurity, grazing resources are either underused or completely unused. This implies that 
conflict causes environmental damages due to poor distribution of animals over larger area 
and more herd concentration in a limited space. Though diverse ecological systems produces 
appropriate environment for pastoralists to manage risk through spatial dispersion of their 
herd (Ahmed et al. 2002), conflict impairs pastoral mobility and access to different grazing 
patches (Coppock 1994).   
Different points of view exist on the role of customary institutions in conflict management 
in Africa (Hussein et al. 1999). An extensive review indicates their failure to prevent or end 
violence between ethnic groups with distinct social and cultural norms (Cousins 1996). To 
overcome this problem, some favor a state to play a role in establishing grazing reserves and 
introducing new land reform in pastoral areas (Scoones 1994). Others support the state to 
advocate and strengthen customary institutions (Lane and Moorehead 1994; Opschoor 2001). 
A good example of interethnic conflict management through the state intervention comes 
from northern Kenya where the state encourages traditional authority to organize negotiation 
on use rights (Haro and Doyo 2004). Such an effort succeeds when it ensures sustainable 
distribution of rights and power to suppress the basic driving forces of conflict (Vanderlinden 
1999). Another experience suggests the state to apply “procedural law” other than 
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“substantive law” in managing the conflict as the former provides a general framework within 
which various sources of claims obtain legitimacy (Vedeld 1998).  
Moreover, integration of informal and formal procedures to transform conflict should 
address three aspects. First, it is essential to encourage conflicting parties to rely on a 
traditional way of conflict resolution as far as it helps develop trust and credibility to 
commitments (McGinnis 1999). There are two reasons for reliance on such an approach: 1) 
traditional mechanism considers local social and ecological contexts in which different 
communities live and 2) the immediate impact of conflict remains to be local, not national 
(Huggins 2003). Second, one has to further examine why or how those institutions succeed or 
fail to resolve conflicts among multiple resource users in a changing resource condition 
(Cousins 1996). The third aspect is enabling customary procedures to make distinction and 
linkage among root causes, triggers and sustainers of conflict. One of the basic problems in 
understanding conflict is overlooking such a linkage. Empirical works show that while raids 
activate conflict (Hendrickson et al. 1998), expansion of farming can sustain it (Gebre 2001). 
In general, the overall increase in ecological scarcity is the root cause (Huggins 2003).   
To understand conflict better, there is a need to make distinction between conflict of 
interests on how and who should use resources, which is a source of dispute and violent 
conflict (Hussein et al. 1999). The former involves competitive demand over resources when 
they are scarce. Violence is one of the products of conflict of interest in which the two form a 
continuum and are not necessarily dichotomous. In situations where there is litigation 
(institutional means), conflict of interest may take a non-violent form (Hussein et al. 1999). 
Therefore, the meaning of conflict ranges from a simple dispute due to unfair distribution of 
benefits to violent conflict involving guns, killings and losses of properties. In pastoral and 
agropastoral regions, the key reason for conflict of interest to develop into violence is the 
gradual erosion of elders’ authority and the state failure to provide security (Kratli and Swift 
1999). Hence, violent forms of conflict may need a different institutional arrangement and 
political intervention compared to disputes. For eastern Ethiopia, little or no information is 
available on factors that have led to violent conflict and the challenge customary authority 
faces (Hagmann 2005).  
The above review indicates variety of contexts in which resource use conflicts occur. 
Whether conflict takes the form of a dispute or is of a violent one, it can take place between 
internally divided groups or between large distinct groups. Causal wise, it could be related to 
some other external factors or entirely connected to competition over resource in the event of 
environmental change. Such possible complex aspects need to be emphasized in conflict 
analysis. The nature of the conflict between the ethnic groups in Mieso encompasses some of 
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these features. The fact that this conflict presently gets national attention and the need to 
understand the process that has transformed it to this acute stage are the central motives in 
undertaking the study and writing this paper.  
This paper answers two questions: 1) what are the causes of the conflict? 2) What are the 
conditions that support (or inhibit) customary institutions in managing the conflict? It 
examines the conflict from different dimensions by heavily emphasizing on existing local 
institutional capacity and the challenge to transform it. The finding addresses how benefits 
from livestock raids, change in land use and increasing scarcity of grazing resources on 
communal grazing land have affected customary institutions in managing conflict. The formal 
model developed reflects the important role of raids in transforming distributional conflict on 
grazing resource into violence. Livestock raid is the principal cause for the failure of informal 
agreements to prevent conflict between the pastoralists and agropastoralists. Finally, the 
findings suggest   the need for state intervention to devise mechanisms to control raids prior to 
delineation of the rights to the contested grazing land.   
The remaining parts of the paper proceed as follows. Section two briefly describes the 
historical relationship among resource users. Section three introduces theoretical concept. The 
fourth section highlights on methodological approach. Section five narrates on the overall 
factors affecting conflict in an attempt to provide details for building a game theoretic model 
in section six. Section seven relates the insights gained from the model to existing literature in 
order to anticipate on the desirable property rights system to minimize the incidence of a 
violent conflict. The last part concludes and provides useful suggestions to improve the 
situation.   
2 Overview of Multiple Users’ Relations in Mieso District  
Recurring drought in eastern Ethiopia has led to a declining grazing resource base (Baars and 
Mussa 1999). It has gradually intensified competition and conflict. The resulting instability to 
the common property rights of Ittu and Issa provides an attractive environment for conflict 
analysis. In this section, effort is made to capture the process of change in the resource users’ 
relationship and the factors responsible for it.  
The relationship among pastoral clans of different ethnic groups in eastern Ethiopia is 
increasingly complex and dynamic in response to change in resource settings and land use 
(Gebre 2001). Change in land use implies change in property rights, as some cultivate while 
others need it only for grazing. This is one important factor explaining the conflict between 
Ittu and Issa. Detailed account of this is given in section 5.1. In addition, change in their 
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relationship has been determined partly by their relation with neighboring clans. For instance, 
Afar and Arsi Oromo have historically been long standing common enemies for Karrayu, Ittu 
and Issa clans as they were fighting for best pastures (Gebre 2001). Karrayu enjoyed a 
peaceful relation with Issa, Hawiya and Ittu in sharing grazing land. As elders recall, the 
period prior to 1940s represented the condition when the Issa territory served as a bridge for 
proliferation of firearms to Ittu and Karrayu.   
However, in response to certain developments, the Karrayu clan has resisted access for Ittu 
and Issa. These include expansion of irrigated agriculture, establishment of extensive 
conservation areas of a Game Park, occurrence of two major droughts in the mid-1970s and 
1980s and population explosion (Kassa 2001). The restriction has become more severe for 
Issa than Ittu due to a close kinship and marital relation between Ittu and Karrayu. This 
condition has aggravated the hostilities among the three (Gebre 2001). Consequently, the 
encroachment and competition for resource that have affected primary users and their 
relationships with neighboring clans have brought an impact on the customarily established 
grazing rights of different clans. Therefore, the emergence and increase in property rights 
conflict between Ittu and Issa has not taken place in an isolated setting.   
Table 1:  Resource Users in Mieso and its Neighbors  
Clans Ethnic groups Production systems 
Karrayu, Ittu, Ala, Nole, Arsi Oromo Oromo  Mostly agropastoral 
Issa, Hawiya Somali  Pastoral  
Source:  Field Inquiry and review of others’ work (Gebre 2001; Kassa 2001).   
3 Some Theoretical Concepts 
Assets at the disposal of an individual affect his or her mental model through which the 
feasibility of certain desired actions is judged. They affect how one perceives and evaluates 
the situation in which he or she lives. This is because action resources are not only the means 
through which an individual makes a living but also they give a meaning to his or her ‘life-
world’ (Bebbington 1999) 
Action resources are also power resources. The nature of institutions depends on the power 
relations of actors bargaining for change (Knight 1992). According to Knight, to apply 
bargaining theory of institutional emergence, we need to allow for the possibility that some 
social actors are more powerful than others and then investigate the effect of those differences 
(ibid: 127). The success of an actor in bargaining is, then, directly related to the ability of an 
actor to produce strategic commitments (or threats) to the rules of the game that provides a 
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clue on actor’s reputation in fixing the strategy of the other. Differences in action resources 
can strengthen or weaken actor’s position and motivation in reproducing consistent behavior 
(Knight 1992). Strong actors (players) tend to show credible commitments to their strategic 
choice for two reasons. First, they are capable to manipulate benefits through altering own 
strategies if it is desirable. Second, the relative bargaining power embedded in resources 
available to strong players might always make weak players risk averse. It pushes them to 
avoid challenging the strong player unless the existing social networks, by providing a basis 
for cooperation, can create a space to combine forces and increase their countervailing power 
or bargaining position.  
Therefore, differences in action resources bring about power asymmetry influencing the 
outcome of distributive bargaining (Knight 1992). When strong actors constrain others to 
choose a particular equilibrium strategy, the weak ones will comply whether they like or not. 
This is based on the implicit assumption that the weak lacks alternatives. Change to such an 
established institution by the weak comes at a greater cost. ‘Change in informal rules of a 
society can be generated either through change in distributional outcomes of those rules or 
shift in relative bargaining power of the actors’ (ibid p. 145). Improved bargaining power of 
the weak actor will lead to a gradual shift in strategy producing new equilibrium. This 
equilibrium might bring fair allocation of benefit from the commons over which distributional 
conflict exists.  
Examining the role of customary institutions in managing conflict implies that resource 
conflict (users’ disputes) is embedded in the pastoral-agropastoral resource use system and 
hence essentially unavoidable. However, customary institutions (norms, promises and moral 
rules) can reduce the cost of such conflict and prevent it from escalating into a destructive 
violence. In using the distributive bargaining theory as an analytical concept, the question is 
how far such institutions are able to create space for bargaining and negotiation to govern 
resource access by minimizing the costs of conflict.  
4 Methodological Approach  
4.1 Data Sources and Types 
Different criteria (wealth, location, clanship and village size) were used to select a sample of 
80 households from 12 villages of Mieso District.  Data collection involved a household 
survey and two consecutive focus group discussions. Trained enumerators assisted during the 
survey. The survey focused on various themes: economic activities involving relations with 
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neighboring clans, pattern of competition for grazing land, reasons for conflict, number of 
animals raided, involvement in violent conflict and participation in negotiation meetings.  
The focus group discussion was organized involving key informants before and parallel to 
the survey. Some of the issues addressed in the interview questions were recapped while 
discussing with key informants. The discussion emphasized on historical and current relations 
between Ittu and Issa, causes of violence, how negotiations are organized, cooperation of 
other clans with Ittu, tensions among Ittu clan members and reasons why Issa negotiates or 
attacks. The composition of the key informants varied in the two rounds. In the first round, 
mainly elders were involved, and in the second one, formal leaders of the peasant association 
and village leaders were involved. This was done purposely to understand how far customary 
efforts and formal procedures are integrated.  
4.2 Analytical Tools 
A game theoretic approach and analytic narrative were applied for analysis. Game theory 
helps structure actors’ interaction and provides an analytical tool to build systematic 
explanation (Bates et al. 1998). Game theory is argued to be incomplete on its own as it fails 
to give a detail historical account of cases. It is thin in that a game model does not address 
complex social world. Instead, it focuses on certain elements of social situations to indicate 
how motivations and actions are interrelated though such seemingly simple models can help 
clarify complex situations (Morrow 1994). Analytic narrative, however, overcomes such 
limitation and provides a basis for iteration, which is required to improve the validity of the 
explanation derived from game theoretic model (Bates et al. 2000). This was done through 
comparing explanation of the model and the narratives built from historical accounts (case 
materials) (see Figure 1).  
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Figure 1: Procedure of Analysis 
Source:  Own presentation   
An interesting aspect of combining methods was the development of new insights into 
conflict situation being investigated. The backward induction in solving the game makes 
iteration necessary. While building and explaining the model, the scenario it represents was 
considered seriously. Others have used similar approach in explaining the decision making 
institutional arrangements between shepherds and their leaders (Agrawal 1997).   
To study behavioral uncertainty inherent in the resource conflict between Ittu and Issa, 
such an approach was useful. The analysis involved two steps. The first was to give a 
description of the essential factors determining the organization of the conflict. In this 
particular case, an analytic narrative gave a basis for constructing the game theoretic model. 
This includes contexts and stories showing why the customary institution is consistently 
challenged. The second step was to establish a game theoretic model that capitalizes on the 
narrative and gives a systematic explanation. Case materials were referred throughout in order 
to improve explanations of the model. Such iteration helped in filling the gap between the 
model and the available evidence.   
5 The Nature of the Conflict: The Narrative  
The conflict analyzed here represents the gradual transformation of communal grazing land 
into contested land. Many factors may be associated with this. In this case, four important 
factors remain central: 1) history of change in land use, 2) interclan cooperation and 
mobilizing conflict resources, 3) breakdown of customary institutions and 4) the economic 
incentive associated with livestock raids.   
Case materials 
 
(Empirical data) 
Game-theoretic model Narrative 
(Analytic) 
Building explanation of 
the model 
Refining Information
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5.1 Change in Land Use as a Source of Conflict  
Historic information from their ancestors indicates that the settlement of Ittu clan members   
in Mieso dates back to the early 1900s. They migrated from highlands of western Hararghe 
because the grasslands in the district were very attractive for livestock production. During this 
period, livestock were their main source of livelihood and they were pastoralists. In the early 
1930s, the imperial government allocated land (about 500 ha) for two private investors to 
cultivate maize, sorghum and bean as well as to produce livestock by fencing large 
pastureland. These two activities competed with the pastoral communal grazing land. 
Investors employed armed guards to protect access to enclosed land. Both Ittu and Issa 
collaborated in destroying investors’ farm and raided their animals in order to discourage 
them and block further encroachment of highlanders into their grazing area. The collaboration 
was strong and successful.  
However, cooperation in sharing grazing resources has disappeared through time due to: 
first, a decline in resource base and demographic change as stated in section two, and second, 
the impact of land reform subsequent to political and ideological change in 1974. The reform 
brought a dramatic change in property rights to land in the country’s history where all land 
came under state ownership. As a result, those landlords, who were allocated land during the 
imperial regime, were dispossessed and forced to leave the area. This change in formal 
institutions resulted in the allocation of the enclosed land to the Ittu clan members who were 
previously expropriated and marginalized. Since then, private land use for cultivation has 
become common. Many clan members of Ittu started to till the land while livestock still 
remained the basic source of livelihood. To the contrary, such event has become a source of 
conflict as Issa has increasingly resisted expansion of cultivation. Field inquiry shows that 
Issa has never been involved in crop farming activity. One mechanism of resistance to land 
use change was to organize attacks during planting and harvesting seasons. This has been 
designed to secure extensive communal grazing land.  
As time goes, attacks have become even more frequent. At present, frequent attacks are   
resulting in reduced benefits for Ittu from communal grazing land.  Many clan members have 
the fear that this may cause displacement from their settlement area in the long-term. As the 
resistance from Issa increased through time via restricting access to communal grazing area to 
discourage crop farming from the other end of the vast grazing land, elders of Ittu started to 
negotiate for access to the land they once enjoyed as common property with Issa. Among 
those agropastoralists who combine cultivation and herding, the claim to presently contested 
grazing area is based on the fact that it has been common property. To sum up, this evidence 
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reveals that change in land use by some users of common property, as income diversification 
strategy, has become a threat for others who wish to sustain pastoralism as a livelihood 
leading to distributional conflict growing to violence.  
The basic problem here is not the evolvement of co-users of the grazing commons into 
‘disputants’ by virtue of pursuing different production systems. However, it is a lack of a 
legal institutional framework through which claims for access can be negotiated, settled and 
sustained. In Ethiopia, the existing tenure policy of the country supports private use of land 
for cultivation as stated in the 2005 land use and administration proclamation (FDRE 2005). 
At a local level, allocation of land for cultivation favored by such policy environment 
contributes to the shrinkage of the grazing area putting the pastoral Issa in a disadvantageous 
position.  
Furthermore, while the state policies support crop production via the supply of agricultural 
technologies, extension services and training to agropastoralists, there is little or no legal 
backing in place to alleviate insecure property rights to the communal grazing land. As 
demographic change in agropastoral systems results in large tract of land coming under 
cultivation, tension arises when pastoralists try (at least) to exercise mobility. This tension 
will be acute as the latter group increasingly holds land in private from one end while 
claiming for access to communal land for livestock production. This can be conceived as the 
struggle between diversification and specialization. A wide range of similar evidences exist in 
the empirical literature indicating that claims for access and use of resources are often 
contested, negotiated and settled at different levels involving different individuals and groups, 
directly or indirectly (Babiker 2001).  
5.2 Group Identity, Cooperation and Resource Mobilization  
There is a general agreement that a state is the ultimate supplier of security to fruits of one’s 
investment. Where no one has invested but claims to be the right holder, as it is the case here, 
who should give protection? The case presented here points out that where both state and 
customary system fail to secure property rights for various reasons, it appears legitimate for 
each claimant to invest in conflict to secure access through a violent strategy. To elaborate on 
this, I give emphasis to the influence of two major factors: 1) the link between group identity 
and cooperation as access strategy, and 2) the role of mobilizing resources in conflict 
prevention and the challenge faced in doing so.  
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5.2.1 Interclan Cooperation  
Historically, when conflict was started, Issa divided the three clans of the district (Ittu, Nole 
and Ala) in resisting Ittu’s access to communal grazing land. The first step taken was to form 
alliance with Ala and Nole clans to use the communal grazing land in harmony. These two 
clans were long involved in crop growing unlike the Ittu. The second step was to resist Ala 
while sharing the resource with Nole alone. Unexpectedly, this step resulted in alliance 
among the three clans (belonging to one ethnic group) to resist against Issa (Table 1). In this 
case, emphasis is being given to Ittu-Issa conflict for they share long geographical boundary 
making the scale of exposure to conflict higher. The other two clans are usually conditional 
co-operators.   
The nature and extent of cooperation between clans affects the decisions of parties in 
conflict. When both clans cooperate, Ittu enters to use the contested resource without 
negotiation because of lower marginal costs of conflict per additional person cooperating. 
This condition undermines the intimidating trait of Issa. Thus, the credible threat from Issa 
encourages interclan cooperation, which in turn improves access for Ittu due to increased 
capacity of self-protection. An important observation is interclan cooperation increases 
security of rights to the contested grazing land. Others have indicated that such cooperation 
cannot be sustainable if there is variation in settlement patterns and geographical locations 
(Gebre 2001; Hagmann 2004). 
Under repeated interaction, interclan cooperation causes a different behavioral outcome 
(preventing conflict) only if the stronger actor is willing to negotiate over rights. At the same 
time, sustainability of interclan cooperation influences the perpetuation of this behavior. 
Similar to others’ observation, cooperation is determined by resource condition (Bogale and 
Korf 2005; Vanderlinden 1999). Ittu secures cooperation from Ala and Nole whenever they 
face shortage of grazing resource in their area. When Issa’s resistance reduces under 
persistent interclan cooperation, Ittu begins to use the grazing area without being 
accompanied by the cooperating clans. Ittu  - as a constrained group - follows this path when 
Issa migrates farther from the contested land or when Issa is thought to get no information. 
Issa observes such a move but keeps quiet to plan for massive raids and attacks. This will 
force Ittu to retreat and begin negotiation.  
A recent study in eastern Ethiopia shows that poor agropastoralists cooperate with outsider 
pastoralists in permitting access to their grazing area in exchange for livestock and other 
benefits. They rent out access rights to common grazing land that improves their wellbeing. 
Where cooperation involves mutual gains, differences in production system do not necessarily 
lead to violent conflict (Bogale and Korf 2005). The case examined here is different. For the 
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strong actor, greater power resource (physical) creates a mechanism to constrain the weak. In 
this context, institutional arrangement favoring cooperation to stop attacks does not bring 
additional gains. This may tempt the weak to mobilize power resources.  
5.2.2 Resource Mobilization    
In the absence of the complete assignment of enforceable property rights, the capacity to 
mobilize conflict resources remains to be an alternative to secure access to grazing resources. 
Conflict, like any human activity, requires an investment. However, its reward 1) might vary 
based on a group competence and choice of strategy and 2) is interpreted on economic, moral 
and psychological grounds. Mobilizing more resources in conflict is considered as one form 
of collective effort to reduce the cost of conflict. This becomes realistic only if resource 
mobilization leads to decline in power asymmetry and ultimately motivates Issa and Ittu to 
shift from violence to compromise and negotiation. From the perspective of Ittu, resource 
mobilization is believed to produce deterrent effect to Issa other than giving rise to warfare 
where one wins and the other loses the battle. Successful resource mobilization increases 
efficient use of pasture when it creates such an incentive.  
Comparing both, Issa can easily mobilize and possess more weapons than Ittu for two 
reasons. First, Issa as pastoralist moving freely across international borders having better 
access to modern weapons. Second, weak control of firearms proliferation created a suitable 
environment for Issa. Prior to change in government in 1991, Ittu owned more weapons than 
today during which customary rights were relatively enforceable. Many Ittu clan members 
were armed during the border war between Ethiopia and Somalia and got support from the 
state to fight Issa. At present, the existing state disarms Ittu for political reasons such as a 
suspected link with opposition movements. Elders of Ittu stated such intervention as ‘unfair’ 
as far as nothing has been done to the Issa. This has created power asymmetry. Experience 
from Niger reveals that where an unbalanced power relationship between pastoral and 
agropastoral groups exists, the weaker party’s need is considered as illegitimate and the 
dominant one becomes inflexible and averts outcome of negotiation  (Nagido 1999).   
5.3  Breaching of Customary Institutions   
Customary leaders played a role in managing conflicts in the past through imposing fines. A 
group that provokes conflict sacrifices bulls. Since recently, there has been a change in the 
nature of the conflict in relation to socio-economic and political factors (e.g. ethnic based 
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federalism1). This has increased participation of state representatives though their task is 
limited to facilitation of elders’ meeting. They play simply a mediating role. In those 
meetings, elders from the two ethnic groups 1) investigate the reasons for conflict, 2) identify 
a group who initiated the conflict, 3) pass a resolution on mechanisms of compensations for 
properties and livestock lost during conflict and 4) agree to avoid further attacks. Indeed, 
payment of compensation is very unlikely. Important questions including how grazing 
resources should be used, who has the right to graze where and under what conditions remain 
marginal. Most of the interviewees felt such questions being less important as the grazing area 
has been communally used.  
Passive state involvement has undermined the potential of local efforts from producing   
positive outcome in reducing the incidence of conflict. Negotiations usually lead to promises 
to refrain from further raids and killings. However, the effect is usually short-lived. The actual 
practice often turns out to be the other way round. An outbreak of livestock raid-related 
violence is observed some time after mediation and negotiations. Such violation of 
commitment is one of the reasons for recurrence of the conflict. For Issa, the opportunity cost 
of not raiding is high even if this creates access insecurity for the other. An alternative choice 
for Ittu is to shift to confrontation as described in section 5.2 rather than going for another 
round of negotiation. This experience augments the extensively documented evidence on the 
limited capacity of customary institutions in managing resource conflict among several 
pastoral groups (Vedeld 1994). 
The key lesson from this is that conflict resolution efforts concentrate more on 
compensation and punishments of the wrong doer other than developing clear rules of 
resource access. The victim of the conflict attaches more values to the compensation to be 
made for the lives and livestock lost. But this has a temporary remedial effect. Some authors 
argue that such palliative processes by attempting to promote interaction between conflicting 
parties divert attention away from the underlying structural causes of protracted conflict 
(Cousins 1996). One of these structural causes is the difference in power and unclear property 
rights arrangements for the different land use systems evolved over time.  
                                                 
1  The change of government in 1991 introduced ethnic based regional administration that reinforced the 
conflict since this area is located at new administrative boundary between the two ethnic groups. Due to the 
vast nature of the grazing land and absence of permanent settlement in the area, this boundary is unfixed. 
Moreover, pastoral groups do not recognize state ownership of land. They put claims by referring back to 
circumstances that existed long ago. Thus, there is contradiction between state administrative intervention 
and history of customary rights to grazing land.  
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5.4 Benefits from Livestock Raids 
Livestock raid produces a threat to the weak actor in using communal grazing land. There is a 
direct link between fear of raids and avoidance of the grazing area. The gradual increase in the 
scale and severity of conflict is partly associated with the ever-worsening livestock raiding. 
Raiding has been organized on a commercial basis, involving accumulation of wealth by one 
group at the cost of impoverishing the other. As there is retribution, this practice is expected 
to be reciprocal among different resource users. However, Issa’s benefit from raids is 
different from what is expected. The robbed animals can be instantly sold at local market or 
are trekked for informal export to neighboring Djibouti. Moreover, informal export 
arrangement ahead of raiding is another reason for engagement in raids, which shows the 
trans-boundary flow of benefits from raids. Meanwhile, such arrangement helps as a means to 
escape from the repossessing efforts of Ittu.  
Raid stimulates conflict since part of the revenue generated from it is invested on conflict 
technology. Access to better conflict technology generates an incentive to perpetrate further 
raids. There is always a temptation to violate customary institutions. Hence, the higher the 
benefits from raids, the more frequent the violence will be. This puts a challenge to 
transformation of conflict and emergence of customary arrangements improving access. Some 
speculate that when property rights are unassigned, power asymmetry compounded over time 
encourages actors to invest in coercive activities in order to gain an advantage over their 
opponents (Skaperdas 1992). Though livestock raid is often high while grazing on the 
contested land, in exceptional cases it occurs at grazing places close to the villages. This is an 
indicator for agropastoralists that more losses could occur during extended mobility away 
from permanent settlement.  
Issa’s gain from raids is closely associated with strategic land the group occupied. Ethnic 
affiliation with political power holders in Djibouti, the fact that the group inhabits the main 
trade route (railway) connecting the capital city to major port and uncontrollable import of 
firearms due to open cross-border movement are important factors creating a suitable 
environment. Some of the interviewees indicated that the reason for the conflict goes beyond 
questions of grazing land and raids. They perceive these as short-term economic gains but the 
long-term goal being expulsion of agropastoralists from their permanent settlement. However, 
this paper emphasizes on the short-term interest, which is clearer, and largely sensible, given 
the opinion of district experts. In situations of the on-going food insecurity, socio-political 
volatility and ecological variability, raiding between herding groups is practiced as a strategy 
to defend and acquire access to vital resources (Hendrickson, et al. 1998).   
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6 Explaining Ittu-Issa Conflict: Game Theoretic Model   
A move from informal understanding to the use of formal game statement is an important step 
in examining the strategic behavior of conflicting parties. As displayed in Figure 1, by making 
use of a case study materials from the actual field setting described above, I assign three 
strategic choices for each player. In defining strategies of each player, I assume that decisions 
for engagement in conflict are collective due to close social relationships. I further assume 
that their strategic behavior reflects their power positions, incentives and goals.   
6.1 Strategies and Outcomes  
Assignment of players’ strategies is as follows. Ittu can either avoid entry into contested area 
(A) or enter without negotiation with Issa (E) or enter after negotiation (N). Entry into 
contested land means appropriation of pasture. Issa has different strategies against Ittu in that 
the game is asymmetric. Attacks can be frequent (AF), seasonal during planting and 
harvesting (AS) or ceased in response to negotiation or any other reason (NA). In general, 
one’s choice of a strategy determines that of the other since moves are sequential (Figure 2). 
Table 2 provides the description of each payoff (i.e. total utility for a player) and the strategic 
choice (conditions) under which it is realized.  
Table 2: Specification of Payoffs and Strategies  
Payoff   Descriptions Conditions 
 
+ b Total benefit for Issa from entire 
contested grazing area 
If Ittu avoids (A) 
 0 No benefit for Ittu from the 
contested area 
If Ittu avoids (A) 
-  c A reduced payoff of Issa If Ittu enters (E) 
+ c Payoff of Ittu If Ittu enters (E) 
- d A reduced payoff of Ittu  If Issa’s frequent or seasonal attack causes 
prolonged uncertainty (AF, AS) 
- e A reduced payoff of Issa If seasonal attacks do not discourage entry, rather 
encourage further use of pasture (AS, E) 
+ f Gains for Ittu (better access, 
confidence, safety) 
If Issa commits to NA after N (NA, N) 
 - f Losses for Ittu (restricted access, 
loss of confidence, livestock and 
lives) 
If Issa violates agreements after N (AF, N) or Ittu 
enters while still Issa attacks occasionally with the 
hope that negotiation will succeed  (AS, N) 
+ j Gains for Issa (raids) If Issa raids N (AF, N) 
Source: Own interviews  
It should be noted that the value of these payoffs and players’ preferences might shift in a 
finitely repeated game. According to Morrow (1994), preferences can change only in the long 
16  Fekadu Beyene 
 
run. This view is shared here given the nature of the relationship between the two players. 
Allocation of payoffs to the different strategies, specified in Table 2, is based on three factors: 
1) discussion with key informants of both groups, 2) considering power asymmetry between 
both players and 3) a closer look at ethnic ties of Issa with neighboring countries.   
Furthermore, there are four assumptions essential to the assignment of payoffs.  
1. Investment in conflict technology remains fixed for both players and costs of attack for 
the strong player is too negligible to consider compared to that of the weak.  
2. The loss for Issa is limited to the reduced pasture. Human death is rare, as they are locally 
believed to be reputable fighters.  
3. There is high level of uncertainty as far as attacks exist, which tends to remain unchanged. 
But, it will be insignificant under full cooperation when the powerful player stops attacks.  
4. Interclan cooperation improves the self-protecting capacity of Ittu, thereby reducing the 
risk to be raided. However, raid is significantly high subsequent to negotiation in case of 
breaching agreements.     
Figure 2 presents an extended form of the game by emphasizing on the sequence of moves. 
The story from the previous section tells us that the first player started attacks as designated 
by the two major branches emerging from the first node where the move begins. Let us take 
the first branch of the initial move where Issa attacks frequently (AF). The payoff resulting 
from this move depends on the decision of Ittu. If Ittu avoids (A), Issa will get b but Ittu gains 
nothing. However, if Ittu prefers negotiation, the next round move will begin where the 
decision of Issa becomes important. Hence, if Issa keeps promises in accordance with the 
agreements made, Ittu may decide to enter the contested grazing area. This move produces a 
payoff of b-c for Issa, whereas Ittu gains c by grazing on communal pasture. On the other 
hand, if Ittu avoids entry for any other reason other than fear of attacks, his payoff from 
appropriation of common pasture will become again zero while Issa enjoys exclusive access 
to the whole grazing resource2.  
However, when seasonal attacks are experienced after negotiation, Ittu’s decision 
determines the payoff of both. If avoidance is chosen, Issa will maintain exclusive access. 
This is not always feasible for Ittu particularly when there is inadequate supply of pasture at 
the nearby grazing land. The other option for Ittu will be to continue negotiation retaining the 
decision path while trying to access the resource with the expectation that Issa changes his 
behavior. Since Ittu is an agropastoralist allocating labor to herding and farming, less labor is 
                                                 
2  Merely for the sake of convenience, I use the pronouns ‘he’ or ‘his’ representing the players. 
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allocated to herding during peak farming seasons. This could cause exposure to more losses. 
Issa expects this event to constrain Ittu’s entry so that he will choose avoidance. However, if 
Ittu reacts against the expectation of Issa, the benefit of Issa and Ittu will decline by e and f 
respectively. In this case, f > e since the cost of breakdown is expected to be high for the 
weak player showing credible threat (Knight 1992). Part of f is not available for Issa since 
violence in this situation involves killings of livestock rather than raiding.  
The second branch of the initial move begins with Issa’s seasonal attacks, after which Ittu 
may choose to enter or negotiate. If Ittu decides to play enter (E), his payoff will remain the 
same irrespective of Issa’s decision to play seasonal or frequent attack, i.e. Ittu earns positive 
outcome (c-d), where d >0 and stands for retained uncertainty (Table 2). This is because 
interclan cooperation during frequent attacks keeps Ittu to hold similar payoff under both 
decision paths (combining assumptions 3 and 4). However, the payoff of Issa reduces by e, 
not c, where e>c because occasional attacks encourage Ittu to stay longer and move further 
into the contested land compared to the period when there is frequent attack, indicating 
appropriation of more pasture. 
A very decisive move is when seasonal attacks urge the agropastoral Ittu to negotiate rather 
than playing enter. Recall that elders of both groups organize negotiation meetings during 
which the state serves as a mediating agent. The decision Issa takes after negotiation is either 
to attack frequently or to stop it in favor of peace and security. If Issa respects the agreement 
that forces him to share c, Ittu’s gain will not be restricted to c; in addition, he will gain extra 
utility from increased confidence and safety. This is specified by f and distinguished to be a 
strictly best reply strategy for Ittu. In general, how to uphold this strategic move has been the 
challenge for the less powerful Ittu and the mediating agent.  
Nevertheless, the decision of Issa to breach agreements in order to play AF will expose Ittu 
to significant asset loss bringing the payoff to negative (c-f < 0). This is observed since access 
to pasture cannot compensate for asset losses and resulting tensions. On the other hand, there 
is an asset gain for Issa from livestock raided in such sudden attacks and utility increased 
from gaining reputation as a fighter. Part of f is now available for Issa and represented by j.  
Hence, it is a strategy with strictly best reply since it always brings the maximum payoff. This 
move tends to repeat as Issa uses raids as a strategy to limit access to pasture and Ittu 
negotiates to gain f besides c. Consequently, the sub-game perfect that carries Nash 
Equilibrium with maximum payoff for Ittu is shaky.  
Moreover, the strategy with strictly best reply for the strong player (AF) brings the lowest 
payoff for the weak player. It can be anticipated that repetition of assets loss after negotiation 
due to unilateral defection born by the strong player may tempt the weak to leave this decision 
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path in order to play enter (E) instead of negotiation. From above, the decision to enter 
generates larger gains from access to pasture than the condition under which Issa breaches 
customary agreement. In short, this means c - d > c - f.  To sum up, the preceding explanation 
produces an ordering of payoff parameters as b>f>e>c>d>0.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 2: A Game Tree Illustrating Sub-Games  
Source: Own presentation  
A reduced form of extended game is presented in Table 3 in strategic form signalling the 
presence of multiple equilibria. To locate these, the focus should be on rows and columns 
producing positive payoff for both players. From the table, it is clear that the second column 
and part of the third row fulfil this condition. According to Morrow (1994), the strategy 
combination that yields mutually best outcome represents the Nash Equilibrium (NA, N). 
However, the above explanation about the sequence of moves confirms the weakness of this 
equilibrium, which is a major characteristic of non-cooperative game.  
Table 3: Game with Pure Strategies  
Ittu 
 A E N  
 
AF
 
(b, 0) (b-c, c-d) (b +j –c, c-f)
 
AS (b, 0) (b-e, c-d) (b-e, c-f)  
NA (b, 0) (b-c, c) (b-c, c + f)  
 
 
Issa 
     
Source: Own presentation 
2
1
(b,0) A
A
E
AS
1
NA
AS
E 
AF
N 
A 
1 
2 
2 
N 
AS 
AF 
(b- c, c -d)
   (b + j- c, c - f)
   (b, 0)
(b -e, c- d)
(b -e, c- f) 
    (b - c, c) 
(b- c, c+ f)
NA
AF
N
(b,0) 
2
Players 
 
1 = Issa 
2 = Ittu 
2
1
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6.2 Mixed Strategy and Probabilistic Choices   
Mixed strategy probabilistic elements were added in order to take account for the intermediate 
values for each player’s pure strategies. By doing so, this section complements the task that 
could not be accomplished using the pure strategic representation of the game. It is guided by 
the assumption that players do mix strategies continuously in their search for optimal gain. 
Decision paths shift quickly in an unpredictable manner. Hence, the utility generated from 
specific strategic move by one player depends on the probability with which the other player 
chooses a specific strategy. For example, Issa’s probability of choosing any of his three 
strategies affects Ittu’s payoff (Table 4).   
Table 4: Non-cooperative Game with Mixed Strategies    
 Ittu 
 A E N Probability 
 
AF 
 
(b, 0) (b-c, c-d) (b +j -c, c-f)   α
 
AS 
 
(b, 0) (b-e, c-d) (b-e, c-f) 1 - 1.16 α 
 
NA 
 
(b, 0) (b-c, c) (b-c, c + f) .16 α 
 
 
 
Issa 
 
 
Probability 
 
 
X 
 
1 – 1.5x 
 
0.5x 
 
Source: Own presentation, probabilities based on own interviews   
 
In finitely repeated games, determining equilibrium probability is an important mechanism to 
explain interdependency (Morrow 1994:188-209). At equilibrium, both players are indifferent 
to their pure strategies, as they produce equivalent expected utility (Morrow 1994; Gibbons 
1992; Agrawal 1997). Based on the field data, certain probabilistic values were assigned to 
each pure strategy. In this case, AF, AS and NA have probabilities of α (66.7%), β (22.2%) 
and σ (11.1%) respectively. Similarly, A, E and N carry x (50%), y (25%) and z (25%) 
probabilities respectively. This does not contradict the increasing frequency of conflict due to 
various reasons elaborated in section 5. The assumed probability values take this into account. 
They represent current state of affairs and local understandings. To determine equilibrium 
probabilities for both players and simplify the analysis, it is necessary to express one in terms 
of the other such that α = 3β = 6σ and x = 2y = 2z. Further deriving leads to the values 
indicated in the last row and column of Table 4.  
For a player, expected utility (E(USi)) from pursuing specific set of strategy Si producing 
outcomes (Ci) is expressed as: 
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=
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n
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CiPjUSiE
1
)(    (1) 
Where Pj is the probability with which the opponent chooses strategy j and there are n 
outcomes. 
Taking the notion of utility indifference at equilibrium in a mixed strategy, i.e. for Issa,  
E (UAF) = E (UAS) = E (UNA)  (2) 
Equation number (2) is simplified using the expression in equation (1). This gives an 
equilibrium probability for avoiding of entry (x*) into the contested grazing land as expressed 
in terms of Issa’s payoff: 
ejc
ecx −+
−=
)(
*   (3) 
where 0<x*<1. This is to find certain probability distribution for the three strategies and allow 
the player to mix his strategies. Given the restriction on the value of x* to fall between 0 and 
1, the value of j must be greater than 0 but less than e – c. From this, if j is equal to or exceeds 
e - c, higher risk of asset loss may always discourage the use of pasture. As a result, Ittu tends 
to stop mixing his strategies and plays avoidance most of the time. This is based on the 
theoretical understanding that a weak player is risk averse (Knight 1992).   
To capture the complexity of strategic interdependence, interpreting the expression in 
equation (3) requires a careful consideration. Having a look into payoff arrangements leading 
to an increase or a decline in the values of x* is necessary. Both c and e are losses for Issa if 
Ittu grazes on the contested pastureland (Table 3). Even if the occurrence of raids depends on 
Ittu’s appropriation of pasture from contested grazing land, both are not observed 
simultaneously as j usually occurs after c. Issa compensates for the common pasture lost to 
the appropriation of Ittu (c or e) by being engaged in raids j. If this is always the case, there 
will be little or no benefit for Ittu from the contested land. This will have significant negative 
effects on the economy of agropastoralists increasing vulnerability and poverty. Of course, the 
extent to which this occurs is determined by the size of Ittu, his capacity to protect his herd 
and the extent of mobility as conditioned by resource scarcity.   
Another typical feature that can be explained by expression (3) is the possibility that Issa 
suspends attacks temporarily with intermittent raids (lower j) for a certain period. This is 
devised to encourage Ittu clan members to use the resource. However, to make the expression 
in equation (3) valid, j should always be positive though infinitesimal. Lower raids or attacks 
mean more c. This increases the likelihood of entry for Ittu where x* gets closer to 0. Since 
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the economic gains from raids become attractive and the strong player is expected to think 
reasonably, he will be careful in manipulating the level of raids not to discourage entry into 
contested land. This is what is expected given the story showing Issa’s involvement in 
commercial raiding.   
The next step is to determine the equilibrium probability with which Issa attacks and 
explain how this affects the payoffs of Ittu. Similarly, for Ittu,  
E (UA) = E(UE) = E(UN)  (4)  
Therefore, using payoffs of Ittu given in Table 3 and expression in equation (1) above, the 
equilibrium probability for Issa to attack frequently is given by:  
fd
fd
32.016.0
* −
−=α
 (5) 
where 0< α*<1 for similar reason stated above. Loss is a function of the rate of attacks. In 
interpreting the equation, the value of f as well as the difference between d and f matters a lot. 
Greater likelihood of attacks (α*) results in large-scale losses (higher f) holding uncertainty d 
constant based on assumption number (3). The value of α* can be 1 only if d ≈ 0.81f. In this 
context, Ittu puts efforts in negotiation (first best reply) or avoidance in order to reduce the 
maximum possible risk of assets loss. However, to satisfy the restriction imposed on the value 
of α* that allows players to mix their strategy, d > 0.81f, but, it must be less than f. If α* is 
closer to 0 (a lower likelihood of attack), f will be closer to d. Here, we find a loss being 
reduced to a simple increase in uncertainty, which is expected to tempt Ittu to play E other 
than A3.   
6.3 Equilibria with Mixed Strategies   
While explaining the game in its extensive form, it has been underlined that asymmetric 
distribution of costs from the conflict motivates the most beneficiary to violate customary 
institutional arrangements. Hence, the dominant strategy equilibrium produces sub-optimal 
outcome and unstable Nash Equilibrium. The reason is the powerful player refrains from it 
since deviation yields better outcome. On the other hand, the cost of breakdown is higher for 
powerless actor (Knight 1992). The mixed strategy has shown how the common conjecture of 
players on each other’s payoff creates a system where they persistently mix their strategy to 
                                                 
3  As livestock is a basic source of livelihood, one time loss of animals through raids can induce persistent 
uncertainty.  
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improve their payoff. This is expected to occur given the assumption that repeated interaction 
creates an environment in which players learn about each other’s benefits from making 
choices.  
Figure 3 provides a simple relationship between payoff parameters of the two players 
under different rates of attacks. It illustrates the situation in which the payoff of a player 
declines whereas that of the counter-player increases that resembles what is called ‘linear 
altruism’ (Taylor 1987) but represents totally different phenomenon. It is considered as 
players’ path as they mix their strategies. There are intermediate rates of attacks. This rate 
(α*) declines as one moves to the right. An infinite number of payoff combinations 
corresponding to these values may occur along this path.   
fc
cjS −
−=1         and      cd
cS −=2   (6) 
There are various slopes showing this. The first slope (S1) displays a condition that Ittu tries 
to increase herd security. Declining values of f along the path represents the trend in which 
the number of animals raided and lives lost reduces in a repeated interaction. At the point 
(b, 0), the gains from pasture compensate for losses bringing the payoff of the agropastoralists 
to zero. This happens when agropastoralists mobilize resource or secure interclan cooperation. 
Meanwhile, the loss in that context is expected not to add to the gains of the pastoral group 
due to livestock death while fighting (wealth lost). This situation could be sustained in the 
second phase (S2), but with increasing appropriation of common pasture by agropastoralists. 
There is a difference between the two slopes. In S1, a smaller decline in pastoralists benefit 
makes a larger increase in the payoff of agropastoralists since they give more value to 
livestock lost to raids. However, this trend alters in S2 due to interclan cooperation leading to 
better self-protection, which further causes a sharp reduction in Issa’s benefit.   
After S1 and S2 end, a path showing partial cooperation (no raids) begins and the cost for 
agropastoralists will be reduced to uncertainty d. This occurs as a result of state mediation, 
temporary effect of customary agreements or any other reason. The payoff combinations in 
the shaded part (henceforth interior) found above L1 and right of L2 show mutually beneficial 
outcomes. This is where benefits of pastoralists could fluctuate between points (b – e) and (b 
– c), but the gains for agropastoralists from the common land extends as much as f + d until 
the extreme right margin at which the attack rate is infinitesimal. From the sequence of moves 
displayed in Figure 2, the pastoral group uses it as a tactic for undertaking considerable raids. 
Thus, the stronger player slowly (or abruptly) moves to the point where α* nearly equals 1 
leading to the disappearance of outcomes with payoff possibilities in the interior. Any other 
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point at which α* is significantly different from zero, but falls in the interior represents 
constrained efficient outcomes characterized by partial cooperation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Equilibria for Intermediate Rates of Attacks 4  
Source: Own presentation  
If we assign the range of payoff parameters for agropastoralists under partial cooperation to 
be γ and that of pastoralists as µ, there is multiple equilibria under repeated game that 
combines payoffs for different values of γ and µ in the interior; in short, c – d ≤ γ ≤ c + f and 
b – e ≤ µ ≤ b – c. Whatever effort is made by agropastoralists, partial cooperation under power 
asymmetry can be sustained if γ < µ for every possible combination of payoffs. The reason is 
pastoralists, as they are specialized in livestock production, depend on the resource more than 
agropastoralists who integrate crop with livestock. They put higher value on access to 
common pasture than others.  
To retain this or find more efficient outcome, there has to be more endeavor to improve the 
bargaining position of Ittu. What could be those efforts and from where do they originate? 
                                                 
4  Just for convenience in drawing, the first entry goes to Issa and then Ittu (Issa, Ittu).  
(0,0)
S2
     α* ≈ 0, (b - c, c + f) 
S11 
Payoff Ittu 
     Payoff 
       Issa 
(b - e, c - f) 
(b, 0)
α * ≈ 1,  (b + j - c, c - f) 
L1 
L2 
(b - e, c - d)
(b - c, c - d)
24  Fekadu Beyene 
 
The analysis from the model and, to an equal extent, the descriptions in section five generally 
point towards the fulfillment of some preconditions. These include: 1) efforts made by Ittu to 
achieve persistent cooperation from other clans in the district, 2) avoiding incentive for raids 
because benefit from raids can be invested in conflict resources shifting equilibria to the right 
and 3) strong initiative of Issa to negotiate on property rights. Moreover, the findings show 
that unless the pre-conditions stated in number (2) and (3) are addressed through state 
intervention, the bargaining power of the agropastoralists will remain lower or nil. As a result, 
inefficient use of grazing resource continues.  
7 Delineation of Rights to the Grazing Land   
The previous sections explain the detrimental effect of insecure property rights in which 
insecurity constrains the conversion of pasture into wealth. What type of property rights 
arrangement is required to ensure security of rights? There are some insights from empirical 
and theoretical literature. While some emphasize on the establishment of formal institutions 
for negotiation (Scoones 1994), others suggest it to be left to the pastoralists themselves given 
that they are self-organized (Sylla 1994). There are cases indicating the success of customary 
institutions in avoiding exclusive rights to a resource by arranging access year round and 
undermining the incidence of conflict (Thebaud and Batterbury 2001). However, when 
conflict becomes acute and internal capacity is limited, the creation of new institutional 
structures supporting the co-existence of formal and informal rules can be effective (Cousins 
1996).  
There is no obvious and easy answer to the question posed above. But there are some 
theoretical views as well that provide some hints. Two of them are pertinent to the situation 
being examined here. The first suggests establishing “a clearly defined boundary” because 
rights granted along with observable and unchanging boundary will reduce enforcement costs 
of those rights (Ostrom 1990). The second view puts conditionality under which this is 
practical. That is, a well-defined boundary applies when flow of benefits is predictable and 
groups relying on a resource are stationary. However, when there are large variations in 
benefit flows and the group relying on the resource system is mobile, then resource 
boundaries should be fuzzy to accommodate variations in group needs and resource flows 
(Agrawal 2001). The implication of this is that rights have to be defined in accordance with 
the resource condition each time when claims are made. This second view coincides with the 
idea of the new rangeland ecologists that proposes territorial boundaries to remain fuzzy in 
order to provide margins of maneuver (Behnke, et al. 1993; Behnke 1994).   
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These lessons have an implication for delineation of rights to the contested land. While the 
first view implies a need for the state to establish group rights, perhaps based on identity, the 
second concept implicitly carries the assertion that the state has to enhance the capacity of 
customary institutions to define various kinds of rights based on resource users’ need, i.e. 
flexibility, as suggested in most empirical works (Goodhue and McCarthy 1999). If 
institutions for flexible access options are not in place, the excluded group suffering from 
increased vulnerability at a point in time encroaches upon the other with relatively better 
pasture. To induce flexibility, the findings suggest involvement of the state or any third party 
to improve the relative bargaining position of the weak group, as persistence of power 
asymmetry has become a threat to stability. Unstable Nash Equilibrium from the game 
theoretic model reflects on the embeddedness of this attribute.   
8 Concluding Remarks   
Resource use conflict is neither the outcome of one time interaction nor typical and costly 
when the domination of one party over the other is low. The paper examines causes of 
conflict and identifies factors supporting or inhibiting customary institutions in managing 
resource conflict. Evidence from the narrative shows embeddedness of interdependent 
situational variables that are central to development of the conflict. Some of these are 
economic incentive associated with livestock raids, power asymmetry, changes in land use 
through the state intervention and breaching of customary norms. An increase in level of raids 
is explained by power asymmetry. In traditional pastoral societies, livestock raiding was 
believed to play a crucial role in redistributing wealth provided that groups undertake 
retribution. This would create system stability. However, the findings of this study indicate 
unidirectional flow of benefits from raids under condition of power asymmetry. For instance, 
the game theoretic model explains how the powerful group systematically exchanges 
livestock raids with benefits of the weak group from the grazing land. In that sense, livestock 
raid is not necessarily meant to discourage resource use by agropastoralists. This leads to the 
conclusion that livestock raids are unpredictable.  
The findings also showed that a rise in the level of raids prevents the weak party from 
using contested communal land. As far as the agropastoralists rely mainly on livestock as 
livelihood source (direct source of food, soil fertility improvement and traction power), raids 
can increase vulnerability to food insecurity and poverty either through asset losses or by 
restricting access options and causing localized range degradation. As a result, livestock 
production remains constrained. For the strong party, flexibility between violence and 
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negotiations secures economic gains. Meanwhile, this condition limits the capacity of 
customary institutions to manage the conflict.  
Therefore, in a mobile (agro) pastoral resource use system where distinct ethnic groups are 
characterized by power asymmetry, traditional authority has limited capacity to enforce 
property rights to grazing resource and manage conflict. The narratives and models have 
shown that the difference in users’ attributes does not open much room for bargaining and 
negotiation to lead to stable rules of resource use. In addition, the costs and benefits from 
conflict are not equally distributed between the two.  
Can the state do anything? Insights from the findings show that delimiting strict boundary 
between the two has little meaning. The state can play a central role in facilitating the 
definition of property rights, by building the capacity of clan elders, through which local level 
negotiations will create a means for flexible access to the grazing resource. This is desired as 
different patches of range resources have different economic values for a set of users in 
different periods depending on livestock species kept. This may not be realized without 
devising step-wise effective political measures. The first step should be to discourage 
livestock raid that frequently happens to be a conflict trigger. These measures may break or, 
at least weaken, the link between dispute and violent forms of property rights conflict. The 
second measure needs to be a change in the state role from mediation to facilitation of rule 
enforcement and internal negotiation of rights.  
As stated earlier, the pastoral group claims access to grazing land based on historical and 
customary basis without considering state allocation of land for the agropastoralists because 
the state intervention in this aspect has put pressure on the grazing commons. However, the 
establishment of internal negotiation on rights, as suggested here, can affirm the recognition 
of customary rights of both ethnic groups. The success of this is determined by the extent to 
which the state law gives a backup and enables local state agencies work closely with 
customary leaders. The experiences from many countries have indicated the success of such 
an approach in managing resource conflict among different groups (Haro and Doyo 2004; 
Vedeld 1998; Hussein et al. 1999).   
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